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THE EXCULPATORY CONTRACT AND
PUBLIC POLICY
RALPH C. ANZIVINO*
Across the country, lawyers have searched for the magic formula to draft
an exculpatory contract that would successfully exculpate their client in the
event someone was injured while participating in a recreational activity
sponsored by the client. Some examples of events would include snow skiing,
swimming at a guest-only pool, horseback riding, white-water rafting,
camping, running in a marathon, visiting a haunted house at Halloween, or a
myriad of other events. The uniform standard by which the enforceability of
these exculpatory clauses is measured is whether the exculpatory contract is
against public policy.
The public policy of any state can be discerned by examining the various
statutes passed by the legislature in that particular state. Many states have
passed laws that provide immunity from civil liability for the sponsor of various
recreational activities provided the sponsor complies with enumerated
statutory requirements. This Article examines all the recreational statutes
enacted in Wisconsin to discern Wisconsin’s public policy on the enforceability
of exculpatory contracts.
The legislature has made clear that absent an overriding public purpose
(opening up one’s land for free public use) the legislature is loath to grant civil
immunity for a sponsor’s negligent conduct that causes injury to another. The
public policy of tort law to provide just compensation to one who has been
injured supersedes the contract principle of the party’s freedom of contract.
However, even though the public policy is not to permit exculpation for a
sponsor’s negligence, it is equally clear that the legislature does permit
exculpation for the inherent risks in that activity. Therefore, the primary task
of the lawyer in drafting an enforceable exculpatory contract is to clearly
specify in the contract those risks inherent to the activity and be able to prove
that the participant was aware of those risks at the time of contracting.

* Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. I would like to thank Ms. Rachel Scott for her
excellent research, insights, and valuable contributions in the making of this Article.
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I. INTRODUCTION
An exculpatory contract is one that permits a contracting party to relieve
one’s self from liability for harm caused by his or her own negligence. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court has decided seven cases on the enforceability of
exculpatory contracts where personal injury was involved, and none of the
exculpatory contracts have been upheld. The court has indicated that the
germane analysis in deciding on the enforceability of exculpatory contracts is
public policy. The public policy debate involves balancing the contract
principle of freedom of contract versus the tort principle that one should be held
accountable for one’s negligent conduct.
By definition, the legislature is the preeminent source of public policy. The
Wisconsin legislature has passed a number of statutes providing immunity from
civil liability, provided one complies with the statutory mandates. The statutory
areas where civil immunity has been provided are alpine sports, equine
activities, camping, agricultural tourism, sport shooting, and of course, the
recreational immunity statute. Since the immunity statutes were in large part
passed after the court had struck down all of the exculpatory contract cases that
came before it, it is instructive to compare the principles established by the
court with the principles established by the legislature.
Exculpatory contracts are a very difficult and problematic area for lawyers.
Lawyers continue to search for the means to create an enforceable one. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court decisions offer clues but not solutions. Rather, the
legislature has shone the way. Based on an analysis of the legislature’s
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pronouncements on public policy and immunity from civil liability, the answers
can be found. The purpose of this Article is to indicate the means by which a
lawyer can create an enforceable exculpatory contract.
II. THE EXCULPATORY CONTRACT
An exculpatory contract is defined as a contract that “relieve[s] a party from
liability for harm caused by his or her own negligence.”1 Courts have broadly
construed the concept of what constitutes an exculpatory contract. For
example, in Discount Fabric House of Racine, Inc. v. Wisconsin Telephone
Co.,2 a drapery business brought an action against a telephone company for
negligent omission of its corporate name from the telephone company’s
“yellow pages” advertisement. In the advertising contract between the parties,
there was a clause that provided that the telephone company was not liable for
errors or omissions beyond the cost of the advertisement.3 The telephone
company argued that the contract clause was a limited liability provision, and
not an exculpatory contract.4 The court concluded the clause was an
exculpatory contract.5 The court reasoned that “for the telephone company to
[be able to] return the charges, which were not earned due to its negligent
breach of the contract, [would ignore] the resulting injury to the customer
caused by its negligent or tortious act in not publishing the advertisement for
which the customer had contracted.”6 As a result, the court concluded that the
clause was not a limiting clause but, rather, the clause “made the contract an
exculpatory one in its nature.”7
Despite indicating that exculpatory contracts in recreational settings8 are
not automatically unenforceable, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has never
upheld one, albeit they have had numerous opportunities to do so.9 The court
has indicated on a number of occasions that the germane analysis to determine
1. Merten v. Nathan, 108 Wis. 2d 205, 210, 321 N.W.2d 173, 176 (1982).
2. 117 Wis. 2d 587, 345 N.W.2d 417 (1984).
3. Id. at 589.
4. Id. at 590.
5. Id. at 591.
6. Id. at 590–91.
7. Id.
8. Richards v. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d 1007, 1015, 513 N.W.2d 118, 121 (1994); Yauger v. Skiing
Enters., Inc., 206 Wis. 2d 76, 81, 557 N.W.2d 60, 62 (1996).
9. Roberts v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 2016 WI 20, 367 Wis. 2d 386, 879 N.W.2d 492; Atkins v.
Swimwest Family Fitness Ctr., 2005 WI 4, 277 Wis. 2d 303, 691 N.W.2d 334; Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at
76; Richards, 181 Wis. 2d at 1007; Dobratz v. Thomson, 161 Wis. 2d 502, 468 N.W.2d 654 (1991);
Arnold v. Shawano Cty. Agric. Soc’y, 111 Wis. 2d 203, 330 N.W.2d 773 (1983), overruled on other
grounds by Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987); Merten v.
Nathan, 108 Wis. 2d 205, 321 N.W.2d 173 (1982); Disc. Fabric House, 117 Wis. 2d at 587.

ANZIVINO, MULR VOL. 102, NO. 3 (DO NOT DELETE)

750

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

4/22/2019 9:25 AM

[102:747

whether an exculpatory contract is enforceable is a public policy analysis.10 In
other words, Is it good public policy to permit an enterprise engaged in a
recreational activity to be able to exculpate itself through its contract for its
negligence while sponsoring that recreational activity? That is one of the
questions this Article intends to answer.
III. PUBLIC POLICY AND ITS USE TO RENDER CONTRACTS UNENFORCEABLE
Public policy is a very broad, but not easily defined concept.11 It is said to
embody the community common sense and common conscience.12 As a legal
proposition, public policy is generally defined as “the collective rules,
principles, or approaches to problems that affect the commonwealth
or . . . promote the general good.”13 More specifically, it is the “principles and
standards regarded by the legislature or by the courts as being of fundamental
concern to the state and the whole of society.”14 In our tripartite nature of
government, the legislative branch sets the public policy, the executive branch
administers the public policy, and the judicial branch interprets the public
policy enactments.15 The courts have stated that the wisdom and vision of our
founders “enabled them to see the setting of public policy [w]as most
satisfactorily and democratically accomplishable by the legislative branch.”16
Public policy is concerned with matters of substance that relate to the public
welfare.17 Public policy is that principle of law under which freedom of
contract or private dealings are sometimes restricted by law for the good of the
community.18 “In general, parties may contract as they wish, and courts will
enforce their agreements without passing on [the merits]. Sometimes, however,
a court will decide that the interest in freedom of contract is outweighed by
some overriding interest of society and will refuse to enforce [the contract] on
grounds of public policy.”19 The decision in each particular case turns on the

10. Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 86; Roberts, 2016 WI 20, ¶ 49; Atkins, 2005 WI 4, ¶ 13.
11. Merten, 108 Wis. 2d at 213; Disc. Fabric House, 117 Wis. 2d at 595.
12. Merten, 108 Wis. 2d at 213; Disc. Fabric House, 117 Wis. 2d at 595.
13. Public Policy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
14. Id.
15. Antoniewicz v. Reszcynski, 70 Wis. 2d 836, 867, 236 N.W.2d 1, 16–17 (1975) (citing U.S.
CONST. art. I, as to legislative powers; art. II, as to executive powers; and art. III, as to judicial powers).
16. Id.
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 8, topic 5, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
18. Merten v. Nathan, 108 Wis. 2d 205, 213, 321 N.W.2d 173, 178 (1982); Disc. Fabric House
of Racine, Inc. v. Wis. Tel. Co., 117 Wis. 2d 587, 595–96, 345 N.W.2d 417, 421 (1984).
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 8, topic 5, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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delicate balance of freedom of contract versus some other conflicting public
policy consideration.20
IV. THE PUBLIC POLICY CONFLICT ON EXCULPATORY CONTRACTS
The laws of contracts and torts serve different purposes. The law of
contracts is based on the principle of freedom of contract in that contracting
parties should be able to govern their own affairs without governmental
interference. The courts should protect these contracting parties by ensuring
that each party receives the benefit of his or her bargain. In essence, contract
law was created to protect each party’s justifiable expectations and honor the
security of the transaction.21 Following this principle, exculpatory agreements
should be enforceable.
The law of torts is directed toward compensation of individuals for injuries
sustained as the result of another’s unreasonable conduct. In addition, tort law
“serves the ‘prophylactic’ purpose of preventing future harm” in that the
payment of damages provides a strong incentive for potential future tortfeasors
not to engage in the same conduct.22 Adherence to principles of tort law tend
to make a court reluctant to allow parties to shift by contract the burden of
negligent conduct from the negligent actor to the innocent victim. Following
this principle, exculpatory agreements should be unenforceable.
Courts often have great difficulty when adjudicating cases dealing with
exculpatory contracts. The germane analysis in determining whether an
exculpatory contract is enforceable is public policy.23 When reviewing an
exculpatory agreement for violation of public policy, the court attempts to
accommodate the tension between the principles of contract and tort law that
are inherent in such an agreement. As a result, “[e]xculpatory contracts are not
favored by the law because they tend to allow conduct below the acceptable
standard of care applicable to the activity.”24 On the other hand, exculpatory
contracts are not automatically void and unenforceable as contrary to public
policy.25

20. Id.
21. Merten, 108 Wis. 2d at 205.
22. Id. at 211–12.
23. Yauger v. Skiing Enters., Inc., 206 Wis. 2d 76, 86, 557 N.W.2d 60, 64 (1996); Roberts v.
T.H.E. Ins. Co., 2016 WI 20, ¶ 49, 367 Wis. 2d 386, 879 N.W.2d 492; Atkins v. Swimwest Family
Fitness Ctr., 2005 WI 4, ¶ 13, 277 Wis. 2d 303, 691 N.W.2d 334.
24. Richards v. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d 1007, 1015, 513 N.W.2d 118, 121 (1994); Yauger, 206
Wis. 2d at 81.
25. Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 81.
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V. CURRENT LAW ON A CONTRACT EXCULPATING FOR NEGLIGENCE.
A. Restatement of Contracts (2d)
The Restatement of Contracts (2d) provides three circumstances where a
term exempting a party from tort liability for harm caused negligently is
unenforceable on grounds of public policy.26 The first is where the term
exempts an employer from liability to an employee for injury in the course of
his employment.27 An employer should not be permitted to exempt himself
from liability to his employee for negligently causing the employee’s injury.28
Rather, this is the province of worker’s compensation law.29 The second is
where a term exempts one charged with a duty of public service from liability
to one to whom that duty is owed for compensation for breach of that duty.30
For example, a common carrier or a public utility that undertakes to perform a
public service for compensation should not be permitted to exempt itself from
liability to the one being served for negligent breach of that duty.31 Finally, the
last circumstance would be where the other party is a member of a class
protected against the class to which the other party belongs.32 An example
would be where the Court of Appeals of Colorado found an exculpatory clause
unenforceable against a tenant after a landlord inserted an exculpatory clause
in a lease agreement.33 It is very important to note that the Restatement
indicates that these categories are not intended as an exhaustive list of situations
in which exculpatory contracts are unenforceable on the grounds of public
policy.34

26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
27. Id. § 195(2)(a).
28. Id. § 195 cmt. a.
29. See WIS. STAT. § 102 (2017–2018)
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195(2)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
31. Id. § 195 cmt. a.
32. Id. § 195(2)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
33. Stanley v. Creighton Co., 911 P.2d 705, 708 (Colo. App. 1996) (“A public policy that
protects tenants from a waiver clause is more compelling here, under a form residential lease, than it
would be under a commercial lease.”); see also Coll. Mobile Home Park & Sales, Inc. v. Hoffmann,
72 Wis. 2d 514, 519, 241 N.W.2d 174, 177 (1976).
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195 cmt. a (AM LAW INST. 1981); Merten v.
Nathan, 108 Wis. 2d 205, 213, 321 N.W.2d 173, 178 (1982); Disc. Fabric House of Racine, Inc. v.
Wis. Tel. Co., 117 Wis. 2d 587, 595–96, 345 N.W.2d 417, 421 (1984).
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B. Wisconsin Courts
Similar to the Restatement (2d) of Contracts, Wisconsin courts have
identified four generic situations in which exculpatory contracts will be
declared void on public policy grounds:
[1] a contract arises out of a business generally thought suitable
for public regulation; [2] the party seeking exculpation is
engaged in performing a service of great importance to the
public; [3] the party seeking exculpation holds itself out as
willing to give reasonable public service to all who apply; and
[4] the party invoking exculpation possesses a decisive
advantage of bargaining strength.35
It is again important to note that the Wisconsin courts have concluded that
these categories are not intended as an exhaustive list of situations in which
exculpatory contracts are unenforceable on the grounds of public policy.36
Since 1982, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has decided seven exculpatory
contract cases where death or serious injury was involved and, in every case,
declared the exculpatory contract unenforceable.37 The circumstances are quite
diverse and involved the following types of activity: swimming at a members’
only swimming pool,38 snow skiing at a public ski hill,39 riding along with a
spouse at work,40 race car driving at a race track,41 hot air balloon rides at a
public event,42 water skiing at a water show,43 and horseback riding at a stable
open to the public.44
Despite the fact that the Wisconsin Supreme Court has never upheld an
exculpatory contract, the court continues to insist that these exculpatory

35. Merten, 108 Wis. 2d at 212; Disc. Fabric House, 117 Wis. 2d at 593.
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981); Merten, 108
Wis. 2d at 213; Disc. Fabric House, 117 Wis. 2d at 595.
37. Roberts v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 2016 WI 20, 367 Wis. 2d 386, 879 N.W.2d 492; Atkins v.
Swimwest Family Fitness Ctr., 2005 WI 4, 277 Wis. 2d 303, 691 N.W.2d 334; Yauger v. Skiing
Enters., Inc., 206 Wis. 2d 76, 557 N.W.2d 60 (1996); Richards v. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d 1007, 513
N.W.2d 118 (1994); Dobratz v. Thomson, 161 Wis. 2d 502, 468 N.W.2d 654 (1991); Arnold v.
Shawano Cty. Agric. Soc’y, 111 Wis. 2d 203, 330 N.W.2d 773 (1983), overruled on other grounds
by Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987); Merten, 108 Wis. 2d
205.
38. Atkins, 2005 WI 4.
39. Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 76.
40. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d at 1007.
41. Arnold, 111 Wis. 2d at 203, overruled on other grounds by Green Spring Farms, 136 Wis.
2d at 304.
42. Roberts, 2016 WI 20.
43. Dobratz v. Thomson, 161 Wis. 2d 502, 468 N.W.2d 654 (1991).
44. Merten v. Nathan, 108 Wis. 2d 205, 321 N.W.2d 173 (1982).
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contracts are not automatically void and unenforceable as contrary to public
policy.45 Rather, a court should closely examine whether such agreements
violate public policy.46
VI. THE LEGISLATURE’S APPROACH TO CIVIL IMMUNITY
At the same time that the Wisconsin Supreme Court was rendering every
recreational47 exculpatory contract that came before it unenforceable, the
Wisconsin legislature was creating statutory immunity for enterprises that were
conducting various recreational activities.48 Since the legislature is the
penultimate authority that defines public policy, a review of their legislation
and the approach utilized by the legislature in granting immunity in various
recreational settings should suggest the means whereby immunity can be
granted by contract in other recreational settings. The most compelling
question, of course, is whether the legislature, through its enactments, provides
statutory immunity for an enterprise’s negligent conduct. If so, there is every
reason to believe that, if an enterprise in its contract follows the same approach
the legislature used to provide immunity in a recreational setting, then
contractual immunity is achievable for an enterprise’s negligent conduct. On
the other hand, if the legislature did not provide statutory immunity for an
enterprise’s negligent conduct, then it seems a fair conclusion that the public
policy of the state is not to favor granting immunity for an enterprise’s negligent
conduct when sponsoring recreational activity. An examination of the current
statutes that grant immunity in various recreational settings should indicate the
current public policy on immunity from civil liability for an enterprise’s
negligence.
It is an important public policy of the State of Wisconsin that enterprises
offer recreational activities to the public.49 In this regard, Wisconsin has
enacted three different types of statutes that are designed to decrease
uncertainty regarding the legal responsibility for deaths or injuries that result
from participating in recreational activities. The first type is those statutes that
are specifically directed at a particular recreational activity and provide
statutory immunity from civil liability to those enterprises that offer said
recreational activity to the public.50 More specifically, statutory immunity is

45. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d at 1015.
46. Id.; Merten, 108 Wis. 2d at 213.
47. One exception is Richards, 181 Wis. 2d at 1014, which was not a recreational activity, but,
rather involved a wife riding along with her husband while he was driving his work vehicle.
48. WIS. STAT. §§ 895.481, 895.524, 895.526, 167.33, 895.527, 895.519, 895.52 (2017–2018).
49. Id. § 895.525(1).
50. Id. §§ 895.481, 895.524, 895.526, 167.33, 895.527, 895.519.
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provided for enterprises that offer the opportunity to participate in equine
activities,51 agricultural tourism,52 alpine sports,53 sport shooting,54 and
camping.55 The second type is a statute that provides a broad grant of statutory
immunity to a real property owner who opens up his or her land to the public
for non-commercial, recreational use.56 This statute is commonly known as the
“recreational immunity statute.”57 Finally, the third type is a statute, which is
not a statutory immunity statute, but rather an assumption of risk statute that
specifies the responsibilities of participants in recreational activities.58
A. Targeted Recreational Immunity Statutes
The first type of immunity statute is one that is specifically directed at a
particular recreational activity and provides statutory immunity from civil
liability to those enterprises that offer said recreational activity to the public. 59
Like Wisconsin, many other states’ legislatures have enacted similar statutes
protecting equine activities,60 alpine sports,61 sport shooting;62 agricultural

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. § 895.481.
Id. § 895.524.
Id. §§ 895.526, 167.33.
Id. § 895.527.
Id. § 895.519.
Id. § 895.52.
Lang v. Lions Club of Cudahy Wis., Inc., 2018 WI App 69, ¶ 2, 384 Wis. 2d 520, 920 N.W.2d

329.
58. WIS. STAT. § 895.525.
59. Id. §§ 895.481 (equine activities), 895.519 (private campgrounds), 895.524 (agricultural
tourism activity), 895.526 (alpine sports), 895.527 (sport shooting).
60. ALA. CODE. § 6-5-337 (2018); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-553 (2019); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-21-119 (2018) (statute also covers llamas); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-557p, 52-557s (2019)
(statute also covers donkeys and mules); FLA. STAT. § 773.03 (2018); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663B-2
(2018); IDAHO CODE § 6-1802 (2018); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/15, 47/20 (2018); IND. CODE § 3431-5-1 (2018); LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2795.3 (2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1663 (2018); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 95-11-5 (2018); MO. REV.STAT. § 537.325 (2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:15-5 (West 2019);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42-13-4 (2019); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-2 (2018); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2305.321 (West 2018); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.691 (2018); 4 PA. CONS. STAT. § 602 (2018); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 47-9-720 (2018); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 42-11-2, -3 (2018); TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-20-103
(2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-4-202 (West 2018); VA. CODE ANN. § 3.2-6202 (2018); W. VA. CODE
§ 20-4-5 (2018).
61. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5-706; COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-44-113; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29212; IDAHO CODE § 6-1107; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 143, § 71P (2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:13-5,
24:15-14; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99C-3; OR. REV. STAT. § 30.980; TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-114-103; UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78B-4-403; W. VA. CODE § 20-3A-6; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-123.4 (2018).
62. ALA. CODE. § 6-5-341; IDAHO CODE § 6-2702; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1542.
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tourism,63 and landowner liability in the context of recreational activities.64
Scholars have suggested that Wisconsin’s legislature act and codify more
statutes relating to the exculpation of liability in recreational activities.65 The
types of other activities which have drawn the attention of the legislatures in
other states include, skating;66 motor sports;67 baseball facilities;68 hockey
facilities;69 bowling;70 paddle sports;71 and pools, gymnasiums, places of public
amusement, or recreation.72
Wisconsin’s alpine sports statute and equine activity statutes were passed
after the Wisconsin Supreme Court addressed whether particular exculpatory
contracts were enforceable in skiing and horseback riding cases.73 In both
cases, the court determined that the exculpatory contracts were unenforceable
as contrary to public policy.74 Subsequently, however, the legislature passed
statutes, which provide immunity from civil liability in alpine sports and equine
activities. It is instructive to examine how the legislature created statutory
immunity and balanced the public policy concerns after the Supreme Court held
such contractual immunity unenforceable.
The first case involves an eleven-year-old girl who was skiing and crashed
into the concrete base of a lift tower.75 Upon entering the ski resort, her father

63. ALA. CODE. § 6-5-347; COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-121; HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-1.54;
IDAHO CODE § 6-3004; IND. CODE §§ 34-31-9-10, 34-31-11.4-2; LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2795.5; ME.
STAT. tit. 7, § 252 (2018); MINN. STAT. § 604A.40 (2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-31; OR. REV. STAT.
§ 30.673; TENN. CODE ANN. § 43-39-102; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 75A.002 (2017);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-4-512; VA. CODE ANN. § 3.2-6401.
64. ALA. CODE. § 6-5-345; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-557f, g; FLA. STAT. § 773.05; KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 411.190 (West 2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.5109; MINN. STAT. § 604A.23; MO.
REV. STAT. § 537.346; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 38A-4; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1533.181; TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 75.002; UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-14-201.
65. E.g., Blake A. Nold, Comment, Codify This: Exculpatory Contracts in Wisconsin
Recreational Businesses, 101 MARQ. L. REV. 573 (2017).
66. ALA. CODE § 6-5-342; 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 72/25 (2018); IND. CODE § 34-31-6.5-4; N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 99E-13; S.C. CODE ANN. § 52-21-50 (2018).
67. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-556 (2019); FLA. STAT. § 549.09; HAW. REV. STAT. § 66310.95; LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2795.4.
68. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-554; COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-120; 745 ILL. COMP. STAT.
38/10.
69. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 52/10.
70. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 41/15; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1584 (2018).
71. MO. REV. STAT. § 537.327 (2018); W. VA. CODE § 20-3B-5 (2018).
72. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-326 (McKinney 2018).
73. Merten v. Nathan, 108 Wis. 2d 205, 321 N.W.2d 173 (1982); Yauger v. Skiing Enters., Inc.,
206 Wis. 2d 76, 557 N.W.2d 60 (1996); WIS. STAT. §§ 895.481, .526 (2017–2018).
74. Merten, 108 Wis. 2d at 206–07; Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 78.
75. Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 79.
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had signed an exculpatory contract for the entire family.76 There were several
reasons why the court found the exculpatory contract to be against public
policy. First, the court noted that an exculpatory contract must “clearly,
unambiguously, and unmistakably” inform the signer that the waiver exculpates
negligence.77 Second, the exculpatory contract must define and notify the
signer of the inherent risks in the activity.78 Lastly, the owner must “clearly
and unequivocally communicate to the signer the nature and significance of the
document being signed.”79 In other words, not only must the exculpation be
clear and unequivocal, but it also must be conspicuous to the signer. The
exculpatory contract for the skiing accident failed in all three regards.80
As noted, Wisconsin passed a limitation of liability statute for participation
in alpine sports after the aforementioned skiing case.81 The statute takes a threepronged approach to protecting the ski operator by limiting civil liability,
specifying various assumptions of risk by the participants, and placing certain
responsibilities on the participant.82 First, the statute limits civil liability by
providing that a ski operator who fulfills all of his or her duties as specified by
the statute83 owes no further duty of care to a participant and is not liable for
any injury or death that occurs as a result of any conditions or risks associated
with alpine sports.84 The conditions and risks of alpine sports are defined by
the statute to include “[c]hanges in weather or visibility”;85 “[t]he presence of
surface or sub surface conditions,” such as ice, slush, mud, rocks, puddles, and
forest growth, or debris, including stumps, logs, or brush, among others;86
“[r]idges, sharp corners, bumps, moguls, valleys, . . . cliffs, ravines, and double
fall lines”;87 “[v]ariations in the difficulty of terrain, surface conditions, or
subsurface conditions” on the trails;88 “[t]he risk of injury or death on trails and
terrains that fall away or drop off toward hazards”;89 “[t]he risk of collision with

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id. at 84.
Id. at 84–85.
Id. at 86–87.
Id. at 88–89.
WIS. STAT. § 895.526 (2017–2018).
Id.
Id. § 167.33(3)(4).
Id. § 895.526(4)(a).
Id. § 167.33(2)(a).
Id. § 167.33(2)(b).
Id. § 167.33(2)(c).
Id. § 167.33(2)(d).
Id. § 167.33(2)(e).
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other participants, employees of a ski area operator, or ski area infrastructure”;90
“[v]ariation in the location, construction, configuration, or steepness of trails or
terrains”;91 and finally, “[t]he greater risk of collision, injury, or death in treed
areas, in areas where competitions are held, and in areas of freestyle terrain.”92
The critical condition precedent that must be satisfied before the ski
operator owes no further duty of care to a participant and is not liable for any
injury that occurs as result of any conditions or risks associated with alpine
sports is that the ski operator fulfills all of the duties specified by the statute.
The statutory duties of the ski operator that must be complied with are divided
into two categories—signage/notice93 and other duties.94 The signage/notice
duties require the ski operator to post signs of various sizes warning the
participants about the afore-described conditions and risks of the alpine sport;95
recommending the wearing of helmets;96 specifying the participant’s duties;97
assessing the difficulty of the trails;98 warning of the ski area vehicles in the
area;99 and indicating that a copy of the alpine sports statute is available for the
participant to read.100 “Every participant in an alpine sport at a ski area is
statutorily presumed to have seen and understood the signage provided by the
ski area operator.”101
The other statutory duties include a requirement that “[e]ach ski
operator . . . post and maintain a map of the trails and terrains in the ski area”;102
“mark hydrants, water pipes, and any other man-made structures on the ski area
that are not readily visible to participants in an alpine sport”;103 “adopt a written
policy determining which man-made ski area infrastructures require protective
padding and determine the type, height, thickness, and color of the padding”;104

90. Id. § 167.33(2)(f).
91. Id. § 167.33(2)(g).
92. Id. § 167.33(2)(h).
93. Id. § 167.33(3).
94. Id. § 167.33(4).
95. Id. § 167.33(3)(a)–(b).
96. Id. § 167.33(3)(b)(2).
97. Id. § 167.33(3)(d)–(em).
98. Id. § 167.33(3)(f).
99. Id. § 167.33(3)(i).
100. Id. § 167.33(3)(c).
101. Id. § 895.526(2)(b).
102. Id. § 167.33(4)(a).
103. Id. § 167.33(4)(ag).
104. Id. § 167.33(4)(ar).
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and finally, follow the various statutory requirements regarding ski area
vehicles.105
Next, the statute addresses assumption of risk in a number of ways. First,
it provides that every participant in an alpine sport accepts the aforesaid
conditions and risks of the alpine sport.106 “Second, every participant in an
alpine sport . . . accepts that failure to wear a helmet or wearing a helmet that is
improperly sized, fitted, or secured increases the risk of injury or death or the
risk of a more severe injury.”107 Third, every participant in an alpine sport
accepts that natural or man-made obstacles, “including ski area infrastructure
and ski area vehicles, may be unpadded or not heavily padded and accepts that
there may be a higher risk of injury or death associated with a collision with an
obstacle that is unpadded or not heavily padded.”108
Finally, the statute places various duties upon the participants. The duties
are primarily safety rules that if the participant fails to follow the rules will
likely be evidence of contributory negligence by the participant.109 In addition,
the statute provides that every participant in an alpine sport is responsible for
choosing whether to wear a helmet or not while participating.110 “And, if the
participant chooses to wear a helmet, he or she has the responsibility to ensure
that the helmet is of the correct size and fit and to ensure that it is properly
secured while [participating] in the alpine sport.”111
Much can be learned from the legislature’s adoption of the alpine sports
statute after the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in Yauger concerning the
balance between civil liability immunity and public policy. Recall, the Yauger
case involved an eleven-year-old girl who was skiing and crashed into the
concrete base of a lift tower.112 There were three reasons why the Supreme
Court found the exculpatory contract to be against public policy. First, the court
noted that a contract must clearly, unambiguously, and unmistakably inform
the signer that the waiver exculpates negligence.113 However, the alpine statute
does not exculpate for a ski operator’s negligence. In fact, it is a condition
precedent to civil immunity that the ski operator fulfills all of the statutory
duties required by the statute before any immunity protection arises.114 Even
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. § 167.33(4)(b).
Id. § 895.526(2)(a).
Id. § 895.526(2)(c).
Id. § 895.526(2)(d).
Id. § 895.526(3)(a).
Id. § 895.526(3)(b).
Id. § 895.526(3)(b).
Yauger v. Skiing Enters., Inc., 206 Wis. 2d 76, 79, 557 N.W.2d 60, 61 (1996).
Id. at 84.
WIS. STAT. § 895.526(4)(a).
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though the statute provides that one of the conditions and risks of participating
in an alpine sport is the risk of collision with the ski area infrastructure,115 one
of the duties statutorily imposed upon the ski operator is that a “ski operator
shall adopt a written policy determining which man-made ski area
infrastructures require protective padding and determine the type, height,
thickness, and color of the padding.”116 It would clearly be a question of fact
for the jury to determine whether the ski operator was negligent in determining
the type, height, thickness, and color of the padding on the concrete bases of
the lift towers. Another example indicating that the alpine statute does not
exculpate for the ski operator’s negligence is the statute’s treatment of ski area
vehicles.117 Among other statutory requirements, the alpine sports statute
mandates that an employee operating a ski area vehicle118 must possess a valid
driver’s license;119 that the operator of a ski area vehicle may not operate a
vehicle “at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable”;120 and the person
operating a ski area vehicle within the ski area during the hours in which a lift
is being operated shall give skiers the right-of-way.121 The ski area operator’s
failure to satisfy any of the aforesaid requirements concerning ski area vehicles
can lead to a claim of negligence. In sum, the ski operator is not exculpated or
granted immunity from any acts of negligence by the alpine sports statute.
Second, the court required that the exculpatory contract must define and
notify the signer of the inherent risks in the activity. 122 The statutory
requirements of signage and notice clearly provide ample notice to every
participant of all the inherent risks involved in alpine sports, including making
available a copy of the Wisconsin alpine sports statute for their review. Finally,
the court required that the owner “clearly and unequivocally communicate to
the signer the nature and significance of the document being signed.”123 Again,
the statutory requirements of signage and notice clearly and unequivocally
communicate to each participant that there is a limitation of liability by the ski
operator, assumption of risk by the participants regarding the conditions and
risks inherent in alpine sport, and also, that the participant must follow all safety
rules to avoid injury or death to the participant or a third-party participant.

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. § 167.33(2)(f).
Id. § 167.33(4)(ar).
Id. § 167.33(4)(b).
Id. § 167.33(1)(k).
Id. § 167.33(4)(b)(5).
Id. § 167.33(4)(b)(7).
Id. § 167.33(4)(b)(8).
Yauger v. Skiing Enters., Inc., 206 Wis. 2d 76, 84–85, 557 N.W.2d 60, 63 (1996).
Id. at 86.
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In drafting the alpine sports statute, the legislature adopted only two of the
three rationales for the Yauger decision. First, the court required that the
exculpatory contract define and notify the signer of the inherent risks in the
activity.124 The alpine sports statute accomplishes that through its signage
requirements of the conditions and risks of participating in alpine sports125 and
by requiring that the ski operator offer a copy of the alpine sports statute to any
participant.126 Second, the court required that the owner “clearly and
unequivocally communicate to the signer the nature and significance of the
document being signed.”127 The alpine sports statute satisfies that principle
through its signage requirements to all participants.128 Finally, the court
required that any exculpatory contract must use the word negligence.129
Significantly, however, the alpine sports statute does not provide civil liability
immunity for a ski area operator’s negligence. In fact, there are numerous
instances where the ski operator will be liable for its negligence under the
statute.130 The only immunity from civil liability is for the inherent risks
integral to participating in alpine sports, and not for the ski area operator’s
negligence.131
This analysis is supported by the legislative history
accompanying the adoption of the alpine sports statute where in it indicates that
“a ski operator who fulfills all of his or her duties, as described in the Act, . . . is
not liable for any injury or death that occurs as a result of any condition or risk
accepted by the participant.”132 In other words, the immunity runs only to the
inherent risks in participating in the alpine sport.
The second case involves a person who was injured while taking a
horseback riding lesson.133 The Merten court concluded that the exculpatory
clause violated public policy because the stable owner interjected a
misrepresentation concerning insurance coverage into the bargaining process
before the exculpatory contract was executed.134 After the case was decided by
the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Wisconsin enacted a limitation of liability

124. Id. at 84–85.
125. WIS. STAT. §§ 895.526(2)(a), 167.33(2)–(3).
126. Id. § 167.33(3)(c).
127. Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 86.
128. WIS. STAT. §§ 895.526(2)(b), 167.33(3)(c).
129. Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 84.
130. See WIS. STAT. §§ 895.526(3)(b), 167.33(1)(k), 167.33(4)(ar), 167.33(4)(b),
167.33(4)(b)(7), 167.33(4)(b)(8).
131. Id. § 895.526(3)(b).
132. ANNE SAPPENFIELD, WIS. LEGIS. COUNCIL ACT MEMO, 2011 WISCONSIN ACT 199,
LIABILITY OF SKI AREA OPERATORS AND SNOW SPORT DUTIES (Apr. 13, 2012).
133. Merten v. Nathan, 108 Wis. 2d 205, 206, 321 N.W.2d 173, 174 (1982).
134. Id. at 214–15.
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statute for equine activities.135 The statute provides that, with some exceptions,
a person, including an equine activity sponsor136 or an equine professional,137
“is immune from civil liability for acts or omissions related to his or her
participation in equine activities if a person participating in the equine activity
is injured or killed as the result of an inherent risk of equine activities.”138 An
“inherent risk of equine activities” is “a danger or condition that is an integral
part of equine activities.”139 Those inherent risks are defined as the propensity
of an equine to behave in an erratic manner; the “unpredictability of an equine’s
reaction to a sound, movement or unfamiliar object, person, or animal”; “[a]
collision with an object or another animal”; the potential for another person
participating in an equine activity to act in a negligent fashion; or a natural
hazard, including surface and subsurface conditions.140 Significantly, a person
seeking immunity under the statute cannot receive immunity if the person
provides equipment that “he or she knew or should have known was faulty and
the faulty equipment . . . causes the injury or death”; or “[p]rovides an equine
to a person and fails to make a reasonable effort to determine the ability of the
person to engage in the equine activity or to safely manage the particular
equine . . . based on the person’s representations of his or her ability”; or “fails
to conspicuously post warning signs of a dangerous inconspicuous condition
known to him or her on the property.”141 Notably, the legislature has chosen to
exculpate the owner only for the inherent risks of the activity and not for
negligent activity by the owner. Unfortunately, the details regarding the
circumstances surrounding the plaintiff’s injury in Merten were not reported in
the court’s opinions.142 Therefore, one cannot surmise whether the statute
would have had any impact on the resolution of the case.
Besides the two statutes that were enacted as a result of Wisconsin Supreme
Court cases, there are three additional Wisconsin statutes that were enacted to
provide immunity from civil liability for owner/operators that offer recreational
activities. One statute addresses private campgrounds;143 another covers sport
shooting,144 and a third relates to agricultural tourism activities.145 The private
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Compare id., with 1995 Wis. Act 256.
WIS. STAT. § 895.481(1)(b)(9)(c).
Id. § 895.481(1)(b)(9)(d).
Id. § 895.481(2).
Id. § 895.481(1)(e).
Id.
Id. § 895.481(3).
See Merten v. Nathan, 108 Wis. 2d 205, 206–09, 321 N.W.2d 173, 174–76 (1982).
WIS. STAT. § 895.519.
Id. § 895.527.
Id. § 895.524.
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campground statute provides that an owner or operator of a private campground
and any of its employees or officers are immune from civil liability for acts or
omissions that relate to camping at a private campground if a person is injured
or killed or property is damaged as a result of an inherent risk of camping. 146
The inherent risks of camping are defined as a danger or condition that is an
integral part of camping, including the dangers posed by: “[f]eatures of the
natural world, such as trees, tree stumps, roots, rocks, mud, sand, and soil;
[u]neven or unpredictable terrain; [n]atural bodies of water; [a]nother camper
or visitor at the . . . campground acting in a negligent manner where the
campground owner or employees are not involved; [a] lack of lighting,
including lighting at campsites; [c]ampfires in a fire pit or enclosure provided
by the campground”; or weather, insects, birds, and other wildlife.147
Notably, there are at least two instances anticipated by the campground
statute that would cause a private owner/operator to be responsible for its
negligent conduct. First, if the owner/operator fails to “conspicuously post
warning signs of a dangerous inconspicuous condition known to him or her on
the property that he or she owns, leases, rents, or is otherwise in lawful control
of or possession.”148 And, second where another camper or visitor at the private
campground acts in a negligent manner and the campground owner or employee
is involved.149 In sum, the owner/operator of a campground is not civilly liable
for the “inherent risks of camping” but is responsible for his or her negligent
conduct.
The second statute provides immunity from civil liability for the
owner/operator of a sport shooting range.150 The statute provides immunity
from civil liability that relates to the noise resulting from the operation of the
sport shooting range151 and immunity from any civil action based solely on the
negligent act of a user of the sport shooting range.152 Arguably, if the
owner/operator in any way contributed to the negligent act of a user of the sport
shooting range, the owner/operator would be responsible for its negligent
conduct. Notably, the statute does not provide any immunity for the negligent
conduct of the owner/operator while operating the range. There should be no
inherent risks of injury or death at a sport shooting range, and the statute
understandably does not address such risks.

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. § 895.519(2).
Id. § 895.519(1)(am).
Id. § 895.519(3)(c).
Id. § 895.519(1)(am)(4).
Id. § 895.527.
Id. § 895.527(2).
Id. § 895.527(9).
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Finally, the third statute provides immunity from civil liability for
participation in an agricultural tourism activity.153 Agricultural tourism activity
is an:
educational or recreational activity that takes place on a farm,
ranch, grove, or other place where agricultural, horticultural,
or silvicultural crops are grown or farm animals or farmed fish
are raised, and that allow members of the general public,
whether or not for a fee, to tour, explore, observe, learn about,
participate in, or be entertained by an aspect of agricultural
production, harvesting, or husbandry that occurs on the farm,
ranch, grove, or other place.154
The agricultural tourism activities statute indicates that a “provider is
immune from civil liability for injury to or the death of an individual who is
participating in an agricultural tourism activity on the property owned, leased,
or managed by the agricultural tourism provider” if the participant is injured or
killed as a result of a “risk inherent in the agricultural tourism activity” and the
agricultural tourism provider posts and maintains a statutorily required sign in
a clearly visible location at each entrance to the property.155 The “risks inherent
in an agricultural tourism activity” means:
a danger or condition that is an integral part of an agricultural
tourism activity, including all of the following: (1) the surface
and sub surface conditions of land and the natural condition of
vegetation and water on the property; (2) the unpredictable
behavior of wild, domestic, or farm animals on the property;
(3) the ordinary dangers of structures or equipment ordinarily
used where agricultural, horticultural, or silvicultural crops
grown or farm animals or farmed fish are raised; or, (4) the
possibility that a participant in an agricultural tourism activity
may act in a negligent manner, including by failing to follow
instructions given by the agricultural tourism operator or by
failing to exercise reasonable caution while engaging in the
agricultural tourism activity, that may contribute to the injury
to that participant or to another participant.156
Notably, the statute is silent on the provider’s responsibility for negligent
conduct. The statute only provides immunity from civil liability for the “risks
inherent in the agricultural tourism activity,” and not negligent conduct by the
provider. Thus, it seems clear that if a participant was injured by a provider’s

153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. § 895.524.
Id. § 895.524(1)(a).
Id. § 895.524(2)(a).
Id. § 895.524(1)(e).
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employee improperly operating a piece of equipment, the statute will provide
no immunity from that negligent conduct.
B. Wisconsin’s Recreational Immunity Statute
None of the aforesaid specific recreational immunity statutes provide
immunity to the owner/operator for the owner/operator’s negligence that
injures someone who is participating in the defined activity. However, four of
the separately defined recreational immunity statutes specifically provide that
nothing in each individual statutory section affects the limitation of a property
owner’s liability under Wisconsin’s recreational immunity statute.157 This is
the second type of statute, which provides a broad grant of statutory immunity
from civil liability arising from recreational activity but is not directed at any
particular recreational activity. Wisconsin’s recreational immunity statute is
the only statute in Wisconsin that provides statutory immunity for an
owner/operator’s negligence that injures a person while that person is
participating in a recreational activity on the owner/operator’s land.158 The
recreational activities enumerated in the statute are not exclusive, and other
recreational activities that are substantially similar to those enumerated in the
statute are also protected.159 Further, the legislation is to be liberally construed
in favor of the property owner.160
The statute protects governmental bodies,161 nonprofit organizations,162 and
private property owners.163 The statute provides that “no owner and no officer,
employee or agent of an owner owes to any person who enters the owner’s
property to engage in an recreational activity: (1) a duty to keep the property
safe for recreational activities; (2) a duty to inspect the property . . .; or (3) a
duty to give warning of an unsafe condition, use or activity on the property.”164
An example of the application of the recreational immunity statute is Held v.
Ackerville Snowmobile Club, Inc.165 In Held, the plaintiffs were on a
snowmobile traveling on a dark trail when they collided with an abandoned trail
grooming sled.166 Both plaintiffs suffered injuries.167 The plaintiffs brought
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. §§ 895.481(7), 895.519(4), 895.524(4), § 895.526(5).
Id. § 895.52.
1983 Wis. Act 418, § 1.
Id.
WIS. STAT. § 895.52(1)(d).
Id.
Id. § 895.52(1)(d)(2).
Id. § 895.52(2).
2007 WI App 43, 300 Wis. 2d 498, 730 N.W.2d 428.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id.
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claims against the Ackerville Snowmobile Club, alleging it had “negligently
maintained the grooming equipment, failed to move the drag from the trail, and
failed to provide any warning of the hazard to trail users.”168 Ackerville
answered by alleging that the negligence claims were barred by Wisconsin’s
recreational immunity statute.169
The trial court explained, when granting Ackerville’s motion for summary
judgment, that the issue before the court was not whether Ackerville was
negligent, but rather whether Ackerville enjoys statutory immunity.170 On
appeal, the appeals court affirmed the grant of summary judgment.171 When
discussing the recreational immunity statute, the appeals court noted that
“Wisconsin’s recreational immunity statute recognizes ‘the dramatic shrinkage
of the public’s access to recreational land in an increasingly crowded world’
and encourages landowners to open their property to the public for recreational
use.”172 In return for opening their land to the public’s use, the legislature
determined that the recreational users should bear the risk of the recreational
activity, including the owner’s173 negligence.174
The recreational immunity statute, however, has been carefully
circumscribed so as not to grant too broad an immunity for an owner/operator’s
negligence. There are three significant limitations to the scope of the immunity
granted by the statute. First, “its stated purpose is to limit [a property owner’s]
liability in order to encourage property owners to open their land to the
public.”175 None of the cases interpreting Wisconsin’s recreational immunity
statute have granted immunity to a party who was not responsible for opening
up his or her land to the public.176 “The legislature did not enact the . . . statute
to stop landowners from engaging in negligent behavior, but to induce property
owners to open their land for recreational use.”177 As a result, recreational users
are to bear all the risks of the recreational activity.178 Granting immunity to a

168. Id. ¶ 4.
169. Id.
170. Id. ¶ 5.
171. Id. ¶ 1.
172. Id. ¶ 8 (quoting Kosky v. Int’l Ass’n of Lions Clubs, 210 Wis. 2d 463, 477, 565 N.W.2d
260 (Ct. App. 1997).
173. Owner is a broadly defined term and included the Ackerville Snowmobile Club as an
occupier. See id. ¶ 19.
174. Id. ¶ 20.
175. Roberts v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 2016 WI 20, ¶ 28, 367 Wis. 2d 386, 879 N.W.2d 492.
176. Id. ¶ 33.
177. Held, 2007 WI App 43, ¶ 20.
178. Id.
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party that does not open his or her land to the public is not supported by
Wisconsin case law.179
Second, the legislature intended by the statute to “limit the liability of
property owners toward others who use their property for recreational activities
under circumstances in which the owner does not derive more than a minimal
pecuniary benefit.”180 In this regard, the statute specifically provides that it
does not provide immunity if the private property owner “collects money,
goods, or services in payment for the use of the owner’s property for the
recreational activity” in an amount greater than $2,000 during the year in which
the death or injury occurs.181 Clearly the intent of the legislature was to protect
the owner who opens up his/her land for recreational use and not commercial
use.
Finally, the last limitation on the grant of immunity is that the only type of
negligence that can be exculpated under the recreational immunity statute is
negligence that is directly connected to the land or related to the condition or
maintenance of the land.182 If the negligence does not relate to the land, there
is no immunity; an owner’s negligence not connected to the condition or
maintenance of the land is actionable. For example, the allegedly negligent
conduct of a club and its agents regarding detonation of fireworks for a public
fireworks display was held not related to the condition or maintenance of the
land, and thus the recreational immunity statute did not bar the volunteer’s
lawsuit against the club and its agents for injuries sustained when he was
cleaning a firing tube and an explosion occurred.183 Similarly, when a child
drowned at a city pond, and it was subsequently alleged that the city’s
paramedical services provided were negligent, it was held that “the City was
acting independent of its functions as owner of recreational land and that its

179. Roberts, 2016 WI 20, ¶ 41.
180. 1983 Wis. Act 418, § 1.
181. WIS. STAT. § 895.52(6)(a) (2017–2018).
182. See Wilmet v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 2017 WI App 16, 374 Wis. 2d 413, 893 N.W.2d 251;
Carini v. ProHealth Care, Inc., 2015 WI App 61, 364 Wis. 2d 658, 869 N.W.2d 515, rev. denied, 2016
WI 81, 371 Wis. 2d 610, 887 N.W.2d 894; Kosky v. Int’l Ass’n of Lions Clubs, 210 Wis. 2d 463, 565
N.W.2d 260 (Ct. App. 1997), rev. denied, 215 Wis. 2d 424, 576 N.W.2d 280 (1997); Kostroski v.
County of Marathon, 158 Wis. 2d 201, 462 N.W.2d 542 (Ct. App. 1990), rev. denied, 465 N.W.2d 656
(Wis. 1990); Sauer v. Reliance Ins. Co., 152 Wis. 2d 234, 448 N.W.2d 256 (Ct. App. 1989), rev. denied,
449 N.W.2d 277 (Wis. 1989); see also Lasky v. City of Stevens Point, 220 Wis. 2d 1, 582 N.W.2d 64
(Ct. App. 1998), rev. denied, 585 N.W.2d 158, 220 Wis. 2d 366 (1998) (holding that plaintiff who fell
because of a negligently maintained bridge was barred from recovery under 895.52); Verdoljak v.
Mosinee Paper Corp., 192 Wis. 2d 235, 531 N.W.2d 341 (Ct. App. 1995), rev. granted, 537 N.W.2d
570 (Wis. 1995), aff’d, 200 Wis. 2d 624, 547 N.W.2d 602 (1996) (inferring that plaintiff who struck
closed gate on property was barred from recovery based on 895.52).
183. Kosky, 210 Wis. 2d at 476–77.
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public paramedic services rendered were unrelated to the City’s role as owner
of the Pond.184 The City’s immunity for its functions as owner of recreational
land could not shelter its liability for negligently performing another
function.”185
It is clear that the legislature has carefully chosen the one circumstance
where it will grant immunity for an owner/operator’s negligent conduct when
that owner/operator is offering a recreational activity to the public. “[T]he
impetus for the [recreational immunity statute] is the continual shrinkage of the
public’s access to recreational land in the ever more populated modern
world.”186 In that one limited circumstance, the legislature has decided that it
is good public policy to provide immunity for the property owner’s negligent
conduct if the property owner opens up his or her land for the public’s
recreational use. Significantly, it is also important to note that the legislature
has provided that once the recreational activity goes from a recreational motive
to a commercial one, there is no longer any immunity for the property owner’s
negligence. Finally, the legislature has carefully limited the scope of the
property owner’s immunity for negligent conduct by requiring that the only
type of negligence that can be exculpated under the recreational immunity
statute is negligence that is directly connected to the land or related to the
condition or maintenance of the land. These limitations indicate that the
legislature believes it is good public policy to provide immunity for an owner’s
negligence only when there is a greater public policy to be served, such as
opening up private land for the public’s recreational use, not the owner’s
commercial use.
C. Wisconsin’s Assumption of Risk Statute for Recreational Activity
The third type of statute that provides protection to enterprises that offer
recreational activity opportunities is not a statutory immunity statute, but rather
an assumption of risk statute that specifies the responsibilities of participants in
recreational activities.187 Significantly, the statute provides that “[a] participant
in a recreational activity engaged in on premises owned or leased by a person
who offers facilities to the general public for participation in recreational
activities accepts the risks inherent in the recreational activity of which the

184. Linville v. City of Janesville, 184 Wis. 2d 705, 711, 516 N.W.2d 427, 428–29 (1994).
185. Id.
186. Roberts v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 2016 WI 20, ¶ 28, 367 Wis. 2d 386, 879 N.W.2d 492 (quoting
Hall v. Turtle Lake Lions Club, 146 Wis. 2d 486, 489, 431 N.W.2d 696, 698 (Ct. App. 1988)).
187. WIS. STAT. § 895.525 (2017–2018).
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ordinary prudent person is or should be aware.”188 Further, the statute places
certain responsibilities on each participant in a recreational activity:
[to] act within the limits of his or her ability; [h]eed all
warnings regarding participation in the recreational activity;
[m]aintain control of his or her person in the equipment,
devices, or animals the person is using while participating in
the recreational activity; [and] [r]efrain from acting in any
manner that may cause or contribute to the death or injury to
himself or herself or to other persons while participating in the
recreational activity.189
VII. THE EXCULPATORY CONTRACT AND NEGLIGENCE
The germane analysis to determine whether an exculpatory contract is
enforceable is public policy.190 Since 1982, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has
decided seven exculpatory contract cases where death or serious injury was
involved,191 and in five of those cases the court concluded that each exculpatory
contract violated public policy.192 Prior to public policy being the germane
analysis, the court used contract principles to determine the validity of
exculpatory contracts.193 Since the legislature is the penultimate arbitrator of
public policy, an analysis of the legislature’s enactments on statutory immunity
or exculpation provides insight and guidance on the public policy of the State
when addressing immunity (exculpation) for enterprises that offer recreational
opportunities to the public.
Wisconsin has enacted seven statutes, in total, that are designed to protect
owner/operators who provide recreational activities to the public.194 Five of
those seven statutes are designed to protect owners/operators who are providing
188. Id. § 895.525(3).
189. Id. § 895.525(4)(a)(1)–(4).
190. Yauger v. Skiing Enters., Inc., 206 Wis. 2d 76, 86, 557 N.W.2d 60, 64 (1996); Roberts,
2016 WI 20, ¶ 49; Atkins v. Swimwest Family Fitness Ctr., 2005 WI 4, ¶ 13, 277 Wis. 2d 303, 691
N.W.2d 334.
191. Roberts, 2016 WI 20; Atkins, 2005 WI 4; Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 76; Richards v. Richards,
181 Wis. 2d 1007, 513 N.W.2d 118 (1994); Merten v. Nathan, 108 Wis. 2d 205, 321 N.W.2d 173
(1982); Dobratz v. Thomson, 161 Wis. 2d 502, 468 N.W.2d 654 (1991); Arnold v. Shawano Cty. Agric.
Soc’y, 111 Wis. 2d 203, 330 N.W.2d 773 (1983), overruled on other grounds by Green Spring Farms
v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987).
192. Roberts, 2016 WI 20; Atkins, 2005 WI 4; Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 76; Richards, 181 Wis.
2d at 1007; Merten, 108 Wis. 2d at 215.
193. Dobratz, 161 Wis. 2d at 502; Arnold, 111 Wis. 2d at 203, overruled on other grounds
by Green Spring Farms, 136 Wis. 2d at 304.
194. WIS. STAT. §§ 895.481 (equine activities), 895.519 (private campgrounds), 895.524
(agricultural tourism activity), 895.526 (alpine sports), 895.527 (sport shooting), 895.52, (recreational
immunity), 895.525 (assumption of risk by participant).
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specifically targeted recreational activities to the public.195 The protection is
afforded by providing immunity from civil liability under specified
circumstances.196 None of the five specifically targeted immunity statutes
provides immunity from the owner/operator’s negligent conduct.197 On the
other hand, the recreational immunity statute198 does provide immunity for the
landowner’s negligence if a person is injured on the landowner’s land.199 And
finally, the assumption of risk statute200 does not address immunity, but rather
provides that the participant assumes the inherent risks of participating in that
recreational activity.201
The public policy on exculpatory contracts is fairly discernable from an
analysis of the seven statutes that were designed to protect owner/operators who
provide recreational activities to the public. The legislature has made it very
clear that it is not the public policy of Wisconsin to exculpate an owner/operator
from its negligence when providing opportunities for the public to participate
in recreational activities. The only exception to that conclusion is where the
legislature has provided immunity from an owner’s negligence in the
recreational immunity statute. And of course that is easily understandable by
the fact that the legislature has made the public policy decision to encourage
landowners to open up their private land for the public’s use and in return has
provided immunity from the landowner’s negligence should that occur.202 The
legislature has made the policy decision that it is more important to open up
private land to the public than to compensate an individual for the landowner’s
negligence.203 This immunity protection, however, does not extend to
malicious conduct by the landowner.204 The principle that it is not the public
policy of Wisconsin to provide immunity for an owner/operator’s negligent
conduct when offering a recreational activity to the public comports with the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, which indicated, when balancing the conflicting
principles of contract and tort law: “Under the circumstances in the case at bar,

195. Id. §§ 895.481 (equine activities), 895.519 (private campgrounds), 895.524 (agricultural
tourism activity), 895.526 (alpine sports), 895.527 (sport shooting).
196. Id.
197. See discussion, Targeted Recreational Immunity Statutes, supra pp. 755–65.
198. WIS. STAT. § 895.52.
199. See discussion, Wisconsin’s Recreational Immunity Statute, supra pp. 765–69.
200. WIS. STAT. § 895.525.
201. See discussion, Wisconsin’s Assumption of Risk Statute for Recreational Activity, supra p.
769.
202. Held v. Ackerville Snowmobile Club, Inc., 2007 WI App 43, ¶ 20, 300 Wis. 2d 498, 730
N.W.2d 428.
203. Id.
204. WIS. STAT. § 895.52(6)(b-c).
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a combination of these factors demonstrates that adherence to the principle of
freedom of contract is not heavily favored. The principle of tort law, to
compensate persons for injuries resulting from unreasonable conduct of
another, prevails.”205
There are other factors, as well that support the conclusion that it is not
good public policy to permit an owner/operator, who negligently injures
another, to be able to contractually exculpate for the owner/operator’s
unreasonable conduct. An exculpatory contract that excuses unreasonable
conduct will lead to more unreasonable conduct in the industry, which will, in
turn, lead to a downward spiral of all standards in the industry. Lower standards
will logically lead to more injuries. Also, the net effect of the exculpatory
contract is to place the emotional and financial loss on the innocent participant.
It is certainly a public policy issue whether a participant should solely bear the
costs of providing such recreational events.206 Rather, the solution which seems
best to comport with public policy is to require the owner/operator to provide
insurance, which can best be used to spread the risks through the ticket prices,
which can be adjusted to incorporate the insurance costs.207 Let the public
decide through the marketplace if the recreational activity is worthy of their
support.208
VIII. THE EXCULPATORY CONTRACT AND INHERENT RISKS
Although they do not provide immunity for negligent conduct by the
owner/operator, all of the aforesaid specifically targeted immunity statutes,
with the exception of the sport shooting statute, provide immunity from civil
liability if a participant is injured by an inherent risk in that recreational
activity.209 Obviously, there should be no inherent risks of injury in recreational
sport shooting. Also, the recreational immunity statute does not address
inherent risks.210 Each statute, with the exception of the recreational immunity
statute, the assumption of risk statute, and the sport shooting statute, spells out
with particularity the inherent risks in each targeted recreational activity. The
assumption of risk statute, however, does provide that the inherent risks of the
recreational activity are assumed by the participant, although they are not

205. Richards v. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d 1007, 1020, 513 N.W.2d 118, 123 (1994).
206. Arnold v. Shawano Cty. Agric. Soc’y, 111 Wis. 2d 203, 213, 330 N.W.2d 773, 778–79
(1983), overruled on other grounds by Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 401 N.W.2d
816 (1987).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See discussion, Targeted Recreational Immunity Statutes, supra pp. 755–65.
210. See discussion, Wisconsin’s Recreational Immunity Statute, supra pp. 765–69.
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spelled out with any particularity.211 Based on the foregoing analysis of the
recreational immunity statues, the legislature has made it very clear that it is the
public policy of Wisconsin to exculpate an owner/operator from civil liability
when a participant is injured by an inherent risk in that recreational activity.
The phrase “inherent risk,” however, is an ambiguous term.212 For
example, some states define an inherent risk in the skiing context as “one that
cannot be removed through the exercise of due care if the sport is to be
enjoyed.”213 On the other hand, other states define an inherent risk as including
a collision with the ski lift towers.214 There does, however, seem to be
agreement that the inherent risk for any recreational activity does not include
the owner/operator’s negligent conduct.215
It is an established principle that an exculpatory contract must clearly and
unmistakably inform the signer that they are waiving particularized, identified
claims against the other party that are within the contemplation of the parties at
the time of contracting.216 Thus, the failure to define the inherent risks of the
activity in an exculpatory contract will almost assuredly cause the contract to
be rendered unenforceable.217 Also, there is a practical advantage to carefully
describing the inherent risks in the exculpatory contract. The common practice
in these exculpatory contract cases is for the defense to move for summary
judgment based on the exculpatory contract signed by the plaintiff.218 However,
the motion for summary judgment cannot be granted if there is a genuine issue
of material fact.219 The typical issue of material fact raised by the plaintiff, who
is opposing the defendant’s motion, is the scope of the exculpatory contract.220
In other words, Was the injury caused by a risk particularly described in the
211. See discussion, Wisconsin’s Recreational Immunity Statute, supra pp. 765–69.
212. Yauger v. Skiing Enters., Inc., 206 Wis. 2d 76, 84–85, 557 N.W.2d 60, 63 (1996).
213. Brett v. Great Am. Recreation, Inc., 677 A.2d 705, 715 (N.J. 1996) (suggesting that any
risk that can be obviated should be, such as paddling the lift structures on the ski hills).
214. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 408.342(2) (2018).
215. Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 85 (citing Dalury v. S–K–I, Ltd., 670 A.2d 795, 800 (Vt. 1995)
(finding that a ski owner’s negligence is not an inherent risk of skiing)).
216. Id. at 84; Dobratz v. Thomson, 161 Wis. 2d 502, 522, 468 N.W.2d 654, 661–62 (1991);
Arnold v. Shawano Cty. Agric. Soc’y, 111 Wis. 2d 203, 212, 330 N.W.2d 773, 778 (1983), overruled
on other grounds by Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987).
217. Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 84–85.
218. Roberts v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 2016 WI 20, ¶ 1, 367 Wis. 2d 386, 879 N.W.2d 492; Atkins v.
Swimwest Family Fitness Ctr., 2005 WI 4, ¶ 1, 277 Wis. 2d 303, 691 N.W.2d 334; Yauger, 206 Wis.
2d at 80; Richards v. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d 1007, 1010, 513 N.W.2d 118, 119 (1994); Dobratz, 161
Wis. 2d at 507; Arnold, 111 Wis. 2d at 207, overruled on different grounds by Green Spring Farms,
136 Wis. 2d at 304; Merten v. Nathan, 108 Wis. 2d 205, 206–07, 321 N.W.2d 173, 174–75 (1982).
219. WIS. STAT. § 802.08(3) (2017–2018)
220. Arnold, 111 Wis. 2d at 212, overruled by Green Spring Farms, 136 Wis. 2d at 304.
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contract? If the risk is not particularly described, then the scope of the release
is a jury question,221 and the motion for summary judgment will be denied.222
Two cases illustrate the analysis when the exculpatory contract fails to
clearly define the inherent risk in the activity. In Hammer v. Road America,
Inc.,223 Mr. Hammer, a professional motorcycle driver, fell off “his motorcycle
while negotiating a turn during a race at the Road America Race Track, Elkhart
Lake, Wisconsin.”224 When he fell off his motorcycle, he slid into a protective
barrier along the side of the track.225 He was “severely injured and was rendered
a paraplegic.”226 Mr. Hammer had signed an exculpatory contract before
participating in the race.227 The defendants raised the exculpatory contract as a
defense to the action.228 The court held that the exculpatory contract was valid
and enforceable.229 The court noted that that Mr. Hammer was injured while
negotiating a turn, which is “the touchstone of the sport of racing.”230 The court
further reasoned that “[t]here was nothing about this accident that was not in
the reasonable contemplation of the parties when the exculpatory agreement
was signed.”231 Rather, Mr. Hammer “voluntarily, knowingly, and expressly
chose to confront the risks and to bear their potential costs.”232 “No public
policy prohibited him from doing so, and no public policy precludes [the] court
from giving effect to his written promise not to hold the defendants responsible
should he be overcome by the hazards of his chosen sport.”233 The court upheld
the exculpatory contract because the injuries resulted from an inherent risk in
the recreational activity.234 The case could have been resolved by motion had
the inherent risk been defined in the contract.
By comparison, in Arnold v. Shawano County Agricultural Society,235 Mr.
Arnold brought a negligence action against the sponsor of a stock car race

221. Id.
222. Id.
223. 614 F. Supp. 467 (E.D. Wis. 1985), aff’d, 793 F.2d 1296 (7th Cir. 1986).
224. Id. at 468.
225. Id. at 471.
226. Id. at 468.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 472, aff’d, 793 F.2d 1296 (7th Cir. 1986).
230. Id. at 470.
231. Id. at 471.
232. Id. at 470.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 472.
235. 111 Wis. 2d 203, 330 N.W.2d 773 (1983), overruled by Green Spring Farms v. Kersten,
136 Wis. 2d 304, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987).
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seeking damages for severe personal injuries that rendered him a
quadriplegic.236 The injuries were sustained by Mr. Arnold while participating
in a stock car race at the Shawano county fairgrounds.237
The car operated by [Mr.] Arnold crashed through a guardrail,
left the track, and then struck a utility pole and a lumber pile
located outside of the guardrail causing a fire in the
automobile. As a part of the rescue operations, fire
extinguishing chemicals were sprayed on the burning vehicle
without removing [Mr.] Arnold from the vehicle. The
chemicals allegedly caused the plaintiff to sustain severe brain
damage.238
The defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis of the
exculpatory contract.239 The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment, and ordered judgment dismissing the complaint with
prejudice and with costs.240 On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the circuit
court and remanded the case for further proceedings.241 “The court of appeals
held the case should not be decided by a motion for summary judgment, finding
a question of fact as to the intent of the parties in executing the release.”242 On
the final appeal, the supreme court also found an issue of material fact and
concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the motion for
summary judgment.243 The supreme court could not conclude that the
exculpatory contract was meant to cover negligent rescue operations.244 Rather,
the supreme court believed that an issue of material fact existed as to whether
the risk of negligent rescue operations was within the contemplation of the
parties at the time the exculpatory contract was executed.245 The court affirmed
the appeals court decision to remand the case to the trial court to determine if
the injuries did or did not result from an inherent risk in the recreational
activity.246 Importantly, the court noted that if the parties meant to include
rescue operations, it certainly could have been written into the agreement.247

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Id. at 204.
Id.
Id. at 205.
Id. at 206.
Id. at 208.
Id.
Id. at 208–09.
Id. at 212.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 215.
Id. at 214.
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These cases reinforce the concept that for many reasons, it is essential to clearly
and carefully define the inherent risks of the activity in the exculpatory contract.
IX. CONCLUSION
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has indicated that the germane test to
determine whether an exculpatory contract is enforceable is public policy. The
legislature is the ultimate arbiter of public policy, and as such, it has enacted
seven statutes that provide immunity from civil liability under various
circumstances. The statutes allocate the responsibility for a participant’s
injuries caused by the inherent risks in the activity and the owner/operator’s
negligence.
The legislature has made it very clear that it is not the public policy of
Wisconsin to exculpate an owner/operator from its negligence when providing
opportunities for the public to participate in recreational activities. None of the
statutes exculpate for negligence, with one understandable exception.
On the other hand, all of the specifically targeted immunity statutes, with
one understandable exception, provide immunity from civil liability if a
participant is injured by an inherent risk in that recreational activity. 248 In
addition, the assumption of risk statute provides that the inherent risks of the
recreational activity are assumed by the participant, although they are not
spelled out with any particularity. The legislature has again made it clear that
it is the public policy of Wisconsin to exculpate an owner/operator from civil
liability when a participant is injured by an inherent risk in that recreational
activity.
The net result of the statutory analysis is that the public policy of Wisconsin
does not permit exculpation for an owner/operator’s negligence but does permit
exculpation for the inherent risks in that recreational activity. It is a common
practice in other states to recognize this statutory distinction between
negligence and inherent risks in exculpatory contracts.249 Finally, the concept
of inherent risks is recognized as an ambiguous term, and, therefore, it is
critically important to carefully describe and identify the particular inherent
risks in the activity in the exculpatory contract.

248. See discussion, Targeted Recreational Immunity Statutes, supra p. 769.
249. Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp., 76 P.3d 1098 (N.M. 2003). The Equine Liability Act
expresses in general terms a public policy of the legislature that equine operators should be accountable
for injuries due to their own fault, but not for events beyond their control. Id.

